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Governments of states that attempt to build new global institutions, interfere in wars or condemn 
other state’s war crimes are events we hear about on daily basis through media. Events like these 
gradually change the world we live in and affect the affairs of states and the relations within world 
politics. Scholars of International Relations attempt to understand and predict these events and the 
affect that they have on the international level, but from time to time, scientists overlook the fact 
that governments of states are composed of human decision-makers. The same scientists approach 
states as impersonal abstract entities that act the way they act because of rational behaviour that is 
dictated by dominant structures.  
Within the field of International Relations, individual level approaches have been emerging for the 
last couple of decades. Researchers of these individual-level scholars attempt to provide for a better 
understanding of world politics by implementing cognitive elements of human decision-makers. 
The influence of leaders’ beliefs on decision-making has been subject of recent studies of cognitive 
scholars. Jonathan Renshon is one of the scientists that studies the belief systems of political 
leaders. With his study on George W. Bush (2008), Renshon investigates the causes of the former 
president’s belief change. He argues that a lot of research on the instability of beliefs still has to be 
done to compose a complete understanding of the interaction between beliefs and decision-making.  
Renshon investigated the influence of the 9/11 attacks on the Operational Code of G. W. Bush. 
Complete understanding of the relationship between the impact of specific events and the potential 
changes in belief systems could not be acquired with the results of just a few studies. Understanding 
arises during a process of comparison results of multiple studies that contradict or show similarities. 
To contribute to the research on the causes of belief change, for this thesis, the influence of the 
2013/2014 Maidan Crisis on Vladimir Putin’s Operational Code is examined. The first section 
takes the role of the study of beliefs within IR into account.  Next, Putin’s beliefs of the pre-Maidan 
and post-Maidan period will be determined by means of the Operational Code construct. In 
conclusion, both operational codes will be compared and analysed to investigate whether the 
Maidan crisis affected Putin’s beliefs.  
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Literature review 
Every minute of every day, scientists attempt to understand the world and universe we live in. 
Behaviour of animals is studied by biologists, the development of the solar system is examined by 
astronomers and world politics and the affairs of states are explained by International Relations 
(IR) scholars. Within the field of IR, many theoretical perspectives exist on how to explain political 
matters. Some perspectives contradict, while others could be used complemental. Walt (1998), 
sketched out three central approaches to the field of IR: realism, liberalism and constructivism. 
Walt (1998, p. 30) argues that none of the theories captures the complexity of the field of IR, but 
the competition of different theories provides for the explanation of almost every aspect of world 
politics. Since every theory is based on different assumptions and critics the weaknesses of other 
theories, contradicted approaches could provide for a better understanding of the affairs of states.  
Realism is based on the assumption that states are in a constant self-interested struggle for power. 
Theorists of this scholar are pessimistic about human nature and this scholar dominated the field 
of IR during the Cold War. After the end of this conflict, the assumptions about human nature 
became less dark and theories as liberalism became leading theories within the field (Walt, 1998).  
The pessimistic world view of realist scholars was challenged by liberal theorists because they 
foresee a slow but inevitable transition away from the anarchistic and hostile nature of world 
politics (Snyder, 2004). This transition is foreseen because liberalists assume that international 
trade results in cooperation and interdependent ties between states. According to liberalists, 
cooperation will result in the development of international institutions through which democratic 
norms are spread (Snyder, 2004; Walt, 1998). Instead of the conflictual world view of realism, 
liberal scholars consider world politics more peaceful. While realism and liberalism focus on the 
role of states and international institutions, constructivist theories base their assumptions on values 
and ideas (Snyder, 2004). Constructivists argue that objective reality does not exist, and that 
political actors act within a social reality that is constructed through debates about values.  
These theories will be referred to as ‘structural theories’ because they primarily focus on political 
structures and neglect cognitive elements on the individual level. According to Hudson (2005), 
these structural theories give the impression that the ground of IR lies in the impersonal abstract 
concept of states, while all that occurs in the affairs of nations is grounded in human decision-
makers acting singly or in groups. IR is therefore grounded in the actions of human decision-
makers, and the neglection of cognitive aspects of decision-makers is not helpful when providing 
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a complete understanding of international affairs. According to Bymann and Pollack (2001), IR 
scientists have three reasons why they generally exclude the role of individuals when studying 
international affairs. First, the ‘small voices’ of individuals are considered less important than 
general structures because, according to many IR scientists (Bymann & Pollack, 2001 p. 108), 
major events and anarchistic structures overdrawn these human voices. As described by theorists 
as Waltz (1959), human nature is considered a constant factor within varying structures. The 
actions of man could therefore never explain why, for example, states go to war. Second, actions 
of individuals are not considered valuable when it comes to generalisations because individuals are 
unique creatures that handle situations too individualistic. Third, because of several specific 
objections by leading IR theorists, the study of individuals is considered hopeless.   
Theorists as Huntington (1993) Putnam (1988) and Waltz (1959), have already implemented the 
individual level into their research, but they only focussed on the role of those individuals within 
instable international structures instead of focussing on cognitive elements (Herman & Hagan, 
1998; Schafer & Walker, 2006). By theorists such as Putnam (1988), leaders are considered 
constrained actors that choose their foreign policy strategy from a limited menu of available 
options. For structural scholars, leaders are considered rational actors that pick the best option from 
this menu, aiming to maximize their gains and minimize their losses (Schafer & Walker, 2006, 
p.5). Amongst these scholars, there is consensus on the assumption that human actors act rationally 
but theorists disagree on the definition of this rationality. Realists theorists consider the 
maintenance of a power position within the international system to be rational, while liberals 
scholars assume that it is rational to insure the position of international and domestic institutions 
(Schafer & Walker, 2006, p. 5). According to constructivist scholars, it is rational to replace or 
reproduce norms to insure an international order that protects cultural values. 
The rationality of human behaviour is questioned by several theorists. Humans are considered 
cognitively limited because decision-making is constrained by several factors. Mintz (2007) 
assumes that leaders are not strictly rational and that they make suboptimal decisions based on 
judgements, emotions, beliefs, personality and other ‘human’ factors. He argues for a more 
psychological foundation to the understanding of IR, since decisions are made by humans and 
humans are affected by emotions. Hereby, rationality, as described by Simon (1985, p. 294), 
concerns ‘the behavio[u]r that is appropriate to specified goals in the context of a given situation’. 
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According to Simon (1985), internal and external limitations exist which constrain a person’s 
rationality. Internal limitations are concerned with earlier mentioned ‘human’ factors as emotions, 
while external limitations concern a person’s selective, inadequate and incomplete search to 
uncertain information to base their decisions on. Individuals are considered bounded in their 
rationality by cognitive theorists and they argue that individuals are steered by their beliefs when 
it comes to decision-making (Walker & Schafer, 2006, p. 6).  
The study of the influences of cognitive elements on decision-making became more relevant after 
the end of the Cold War (Walker & Schafer, 2006, p. 6; Herman & Hagan, 1998, p. 125). During 
the Cold War, the world was highly structured by a bipolar balance of power between the Soviet 
Union and ‘The West’. This highly structured world order provided a menu with a limited range 
of choices for leaders. Superpowers had to determine the fears of other countries and had to respond 
to these fears in order to stabilise the balance of power. Smaller powers only had to recognize the 
power of the hegemonies and calculated ways to stay aside from the conflict or decided to ally with 
one of the superpowers to involve in the conflict (Walker & Schafer, 2006, p. 6). Therefore, 
theorists were able to explain and predict actions of leaders by structural theories (Walker & 
Schafer, 2006, p. 6). The post-Cold War era became less structured and the consensus on the nature 
of the new world order declined (Herman & Hagan, 1998, p. 125). Questions rose about whether 
the new world order was unipolar, bipolar or multipolar. States could therefore involve in, inter 
alia, unilateral, multilateral, regional or global affairs. This resulted in more different 
interpretations of situations and miscommunication between leaders. Structural theories started to 
fail to explain decision-making on foreign policy in this more chaotic world order (Mintz, 2007; 
Walker & Schafer, 2006). A broader range of sources for threats and opportunities occurred 
because of globalisation and the emerge of more actors within political processes (Schafer & 
Walker, 2006). Policy makers were forced to focus more on their internal focal points because clear 
external focal points disappeared with the end of the Cold War (Walker & Schafer, 2006, p. 4). 
Because policy makers started to rely more on their subjective world view when calculating foreign 
policy strategies, IR scholars started to focus more on the cognitive level of individuals.  
Because of structural scholars’ failure of explaining major events in world politics, micro-
foundations of theories had to be reconsidered. Although, the end of the Cold War era intensified 
the need for new thoughts on theoretical frameworks about interactions in world politics (Hermann 
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& Hagan, 1998; Hudson, 2006; Walker & Schafer, 2006; Mintz, 2007), before the end of this era, 
attention on cognitive elements of behaviour of individuals was already focussed within the field 
of IR (George, 1969; Brodin, 1972; Walker, 1983; Rosenberg, 1986). Cognitive theories differ 
from structural theories regarding the role of leaders’ beliefs as causal mechanism of beliefs upon 
decision-making, because cognitive theories allow for the possibility that beliefs can actively steer 
the choices of leaders instead of a just passively offering a reflection of reality (Walker & Schafer, 
2006, p. 5). Holsti (1976, pp. 12-13) also recognizes the potential influence of beliefs on the 
outcome of decision-making but argues that systematic research on the relationship between beliefs 
and decision-making has relatively been neglected in political science. Holsti’s 1976 research states 
certain circumstances under which the causal mechanism between beliefs and decision-making is 
likely to occur. First, when the environment is uncertain and when it is difficult for a leader to 
organise and process certain information due to scarcity, ambiguousness or contradictions, and 
second, when new information does not fit with a leader’s pre-existing beliefs based on old 
information, stereotypes or other cognitive biases associated with strong emotions (Holsti, 1976).  
Although research on the influence of beliefs on decision making is not new to the field of IR, the 
understanding of this relationship is far from perfect (Renshon, 2008, pp. 820-822). George (1969, 
p. 191) already claimed that beliefs are one of the variables that influence, but do not determine 
decision-making. Contemporary research on beliefs still focusses on questions on how and why 
beliefs shape or steer decisions and what beliefs are affected by (Feng, 2005; Renshon, 2008; 
Forsberg & Pursiainen, 2017; Dyson & Partent, 2018). The first step in these studies is the 
determination of what beliefs in fact are. Renshon (2008, p. 822) describes beliefs as ‘that which 
we hold to be true’. Beliefs consist of propositions of fundamental assumptions on causal relations 
and the way the world operates. As described by George (1969, p. 191) ‘beliefs provide norms, 
standards and guidelines that influence the actor's choice of strategy and tactics, his structuring and 
weighing of alternative courses of action’. Studying beliefs of leaders is considered theoretically 
useful because it seems critical in the understanding of decision-making, because beliefs act as 
filter through which perceptual processes operate (Renshon, 2008, pp. 820-822). Individuals do not 
react to an objective world around them, but filter everything that happens around them through 
their beliefs into a subjective reality. Decision-making of leaders is, potentially, steered by their 
beliefs because it offers them a framework to decomplexify their subjective view on reality.  
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Because the understanding of the influence of beliefs on decision-making processes is far from 
perfect, a lot of research has done and has to be done on this subject. The stability of beliefs is, for 
example, a subject that is studied and questioned by political scientists. On one hand, the stability 
of beliefs has convincingly proven by studies that were held in laboratory-settings (Renshon, 2008, 
p. 820), but on the other hand, belief stability has been disputed by several studies by, inter alia, 
Walker et al. (1998), Feng (2005) and Renshon (2008). These scientists used Alexander George’s 
Operational Code construct to determine a leader’s belief system. A belief system could be 
described as ‘spider’s web’ with all beliefs connected to each other by strands which originate in 
the centre of the web’ (Rosenberg, 1986, p. 735). By means of George’s Operational Code 
construct, the belief systems from multiple time periods of leaders as Jimmy Carter, Mao Zedong 
and George W. Bush and were determined and scientists diagnosed significant differences between 
the belief systems of the different time periods. Little understanding exists about the causes of these 
changes of belief systems (Renshon, 2008, p. 825). Studies about the change of belief systems of 
Carter (Walker et al., 1998), Zedong (Feng, 2005) and Bush (Renshon, 2008) found differences of 
belief systems after specific events during their presidencies. Carter’s belief system significantly 
changed after the 1979 Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, Mao’s beliefs were affected by the Korean 
war and Bush’s shifted after the 9/11 attack. This empirical research is helpful in the study on the 
causes belief change and stability and with this thesis, I attempt to contribute to this line of research 
and examine what influence specific events have on the Operational Code, and therefore belief 
systems, of leaders. The research question of this thesis will therefore be: what influence have 
specific events on a leader’s belief system?  
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Theoretical Framework  
The instability of belief systems has been studied by several scientists (Walker et al., 1998; Feng, 
2005; Renshon 2008) that used the Operational Code construct to determine a leader’s belief 
system. The Operational Code is a theory developed by Alexander George (1969) and is inspired 
by Nathan Leites’ A Study of Bolshevism. Leites focusses on the relationship between belief 
systems of elites and their decision-making (George, 1969, p. 191). These elite belief systems are 
composed of a general set of beliefs about fundamental historical issues and central questions on 
politics in general. The idea behind Leites’ ‘operational code’ is that these beliefs provide norms, 
standards and guidelines that influence an actor’s tactic or choice of action (George, 1969, p. 191). 
One’s Operational Code is, according to Leites and George (1969), one of the variables that 
influences human decision-making, but does not determine it (George, 1969, p. 191). George 
(1969, pp. 191-194) used Leites’ principles to design a more codified and explicit model to study 
decision-making on the individual level, because he believes Leites’ original work is useful and 
inspirational on one hand, but unusually difficult to understand on the other hand. The Operational 
Code could be a useful link to psychodynamic interpretations of the role of beliefs systems in an 
individual’s behaviour under certain conditions (George, 1969, p. 195). Where Leites started to 
describe Bolshevik political strategy by Bolshevik characteristics, George conceptualized a 
leader’s Operational Code as a belief system with philosophical beliefs that guide instrumental 
beliefs prescribing the most effective choice of action (Walker & Schafer, 2006, p. 4).  These 
philosophical and instrumental beliefs are the key components of George’s Operational Code 
construct. To determine a leader’s operational code, five questions about each category of beliefs 
should be answered (Schafer & Walker, 2006, pp. 8-9). Thus, a leader’s belief system is composed 
of the answers to these questions about political life. Philosophical beliefs are composed of 
assumptions and premises about, inter alia, the fundamental nature of politics and conflict, and the 
historical role of the individual (George, 1969, p. 199). Philosophical beliefs cover more general 
questions and issues than instrumental beliefs, which are composed of matters of more specific 
decision-making and implementation of policy (George, 1969, pp. 198-199). The ten questions, of 
which the answers design a leader’s operational code, are presented in table 1.  
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Table 1: The Operational Code (Source: George, 1969) 
Assumptions are made about the nature of belief systems by, inter alia, Philipp Rosenberg (1986) 
and Walker et al. (1998). Rosenberg (1986, pp. 735-736) assumes that belief systems are internally 
consistent, which means that different beliefs are logically coherent (Renshon, 2008, p. 823). 
Hereby, Rosenberg assumes that beliefs are ordered on a central-peripheral scale and that more 
peripheral, less important beliefs derive from central, more fundamental beliefs. Rosenberg argues 
that peripheral beliefs change when central beliefs change. This principle of hierarchy is essential 
in the understanding of the internal consistency of belief systems. By these assumptions, belief 
systems could be seen as metaphorical spider’s webs in which all beliefs are connected to the centre 
of the ‘Weltanschauung’, ‘a comprehensive, esp. personal, philosophy or conception of the 
universe and of human life’ (Rosenberg, 1986, pp. 735-736). An individual’s ‘Weltanschauung’ 
could shape political beliefs, from which foreign policy beliefs derive. George’s distinction 
between philosophical and instrumental beliefs fits in Rosenberg’s assumption of hierarchical 
ordered beliefs. Instrumental beliefs theoretically shift when a leader’s philosophical beliefs 
Philosophical  
P-1: What is the essential nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or 
conflict? What is the fundamental character of one’s political opponents?  
P-2: What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one’s fundamental political values and 
aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this score; and in what respects the one 
and/or the other? 
P-3: Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?  
P-4: How much control or mastery can one have over historical development? What is one’s role in 
moving and shaping history in the desired direction?  
P-5: What is the role of chance in human affairs and in historical development?  
 
Instrumental  
I-1: What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action? 
I-2: How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?  
I-3: How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?  
I-4: What is the best timing of action to advance one’s interest?  
I-5: What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one’s interests? 
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change and because philosophical beliefs are more fundamental, scientists assume that they are 
more prone to change than instrumental beliefs (Renshon, 2008, p. 827). Taken this into 
consideration, scientists could philosophical beliefs expect to change relatively less than 
instrumental beliefs. However, the opposite pattern is found by earlier studies (Renshon, 2008, pp. 
827-828). In addition, Walker et al. (1998, p. 176), argue, based on Converse’s study on the nature 
of belief systems in mass publics (1964), that belief systems are considered to remain stable over 
time. This stability was supported by empirical research for some, but not all, leaders (Holsti, 1977; 
Walker & Falowski, 1984; Malici & Malici, 2005). The logic of cognitive consistency, that is 
derive from the principles explained by Rosenberg (1986) and Walker et al. (1998), are based on 
the assumptions that individuals act rationally based on what they believe and that others, in social 
situations, expect them to do so (Walker et al., 2010a, p. 219).  
Another assumption that is made about the nature of belief systems, is the hierarchal distinction 
between ‘master’ and ‘other’ beliefs (George, 1969; Holsti, 1977).  According to George (1969) 
and Holsti (1977) the first philosophical belief forms a fundament for the other philosophical 
beliefs. Based on the assumption of cognitive consistency, instrumental beliefs derive from the 
philosophical beliefs, and therefore, all instrumental beliefs flow from P1, the first philosophical 
belief. George and Holsti assume that the beliefs about the nature of politics and the orientation of 
other political actors form the essential basis for other philosophical beliefs and courses of action. 
George (1969) and Holsti (1977), already refute the assumption that beliefs remain stable over time 
but consider belief systems relatively prone to change. Empirical research by Walker and Schafer 
(2006, p. 50) suggests that philosophical and instrumental beliefs vary significantly. They assume 
that instrumental beliefs do not necessarily flow from philosophical beliefs, and therefore, they 
conceptualized two, instead of one, master beliefs within the Operational Code. I-1, the first 
instrumental belief, is conceptualized as master belief as well. For this reason, Walker and Schafer 
(2006) dispute the principle of cognitive consistency when it comes to the consistency between the 
two sets of beliefs. Cognitive consistency is still acknowledged within the two sets of beliefs. Both 
first beliefs, P-1 and I-1, are conceptualized as master beliefs because other beliefs should derive 
from them.  
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To determine leaders’ belief systems, researchers are limited in the options because it is difficult 
to study a political leader directly by, for example, interviews or experiments. Because of this 
problem, political scientists have developed techniques to analyse leaders ‘at-a-distance’ (Schafer 
& Walker, 2006). The advantage of using a ‘at-a-distance’ method is that psychological 
characteristics can be assessed without direct access to a leader. Contemporary Operational Code 
studies (Walker et al., 1998; Feng, 2005; Renshon 2008) use the Verbs In Context System (VICS) 
to analyse content and quantify the answers to George’s questions (Schafer & Walker, 2006, p. 8). 
Verbal communication is analysed to indicate a person’s state of mind, because the premise is that 
the way individuals speak about power and the field of politics, will tell much about their exercise 
of power (Schafer & Walker, 2006, p. 30). In other words, constructs, as Operational Code, are 
developed to connect the systematically analysed verbal behaviour to an actor’s psychology 
(Schafer & Walker, 2006, p. 26). The VICS is used to quantify the answers to the Operational Code 
questions. Beliefs are calculated through VICS and result in scores on every question of the 
construct. These calculations are from now on referred to as indices. What these indices mean and 
how they relate to the questions, will be briefly discussed in this method section of this thesis.  
Relevance of the Operational Code construct  
As explained in the literature review, the field of IR is grounded in human decision-makers acting 
singly or in groups (Hudson, 2005). When explaining world politics, studying cognitive aspects of 
decision-makers is helpful in the provision of a complete understanding of the field. As described 
by Walker (1990, pp. 406-407), the Leites-George paradigm, Operational Code construct, offers 
an alternative to the classic rational-actor assumption that all policy decisions could be explained 
by an actor’s cost-benefit analysis. This classic approach explains made decisions by the constant 
factor of decision-makers that operate under uncertain structures (Waltz, 1959; Walker, 1990). By 
this approach, every decision-maker is claimed to act the same under given circumstances, because 
they are considered to have the same approaches to rationality (Walker, 1990, p. 407). The 
alternative Leites-George paradigm has three assumptions that contradict the rational-actor 
approach (Walker, 1990, p. 406-407). First, every decision-maker has a unique composition of 
beliefs, personal traits and choice propensities. Second, this composition structures the decision-
maker’s range of goals and shapes the analysis of alternatives. And last, insofar as possible, the 
choices of the decision-maker are consistent with the first two principles and shape the boundaries 
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of rational behaviour of the decision-maker. Although, the assumption that the composition of 
beliefs, traits and choice propensities shape decisions is made, the actual impact of the individual’s 
composition and the outcome of choices is not clearly defined (Walker, 1990; Renshon, 2008).  
Within the Operational Code research program, scientists attempt to gain better understanding of 
the impact of beliefs on decisions (Walker, 1990; Marfleet & Walker, 2006). One of the fields of 
policy that is included in the research program, is the field of foreign policy and international affairs 
(Marfleet & Walker, 2006, p. 53). According to Marfleet and Walker (2006, pp. 53-54) several 
levels of foreign policy decisions could be distinguished. At the most basic level, words and deeds 
represent the exercise of political power by the state. Words and deeds, that are bounded to the 
words and deeds of other states, could be translated into moves. One state’s moves are related to 
the moves of other states, and different sequences of moves over time form a state’s tactics. 
Different sequences of tactics that interact between states, could compose the final level of foreign 
policy decisions; strategies. Taken these levels into consideration, the fields of both foreign policy 
and international relations could be studied by shifting the unit of analysis from the state to the 
systematic level (Marfleet & Walker, 2006, p. 54). Along with this shift, the unit of decision-
making moves from a state’s exercise of power by word and deeds to strategic interaction by the 
interplay of power between states. The initial IR puzzles focus on the interaction and relations 
between states, but the operational code construct adds the analysis of behavioural interaction and 
beliefs of leaders to these puzzles (Marfleet & Walker, 2006, p. 55). The context in which strategic 
choices are made are not neglected, but operational code analyses focus on the leader’s belief 
system and the influence of these systems on the strategic moves he/she makes. Thus, with the 
Operational Code construct, the interaction between an individual’s beliefs, which represent the 
cognition, upon, for example, foreign policy decisions is analysed. Studies of the Operational Code 
scholar are relevant for the complete understanding of IR. As stated by George (1969, 1979), the 
Operational Code is a theory with which determines one variable, the beliefs, within a complex 
and causal framework for explaining (foreign) decision-making. Although, the leader’s beliefs do 
not determine, but influence, foreign policy, they are considered an important variable within the 
structures of world politics and to provide a complete understanding of the affairs of states, the 
Operational Code beliefs should be taken into consideration (George, 1969; Brodin, 1972; 
Renshon, 2008). 
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Empirical research  
As explained before, the exact relationship between an individual’s beliefs and their influence on 
decision-making has not yet been determined, but research on this subject is already done by 
several scientists. Empirically, changes in belief systems are found through studies by, inter alia, 
Walker et al. (1998), Walker and Schafer (2000), Feng (2005), Malici and Malici (2005) and 
Renshon (2008). Theoretically, briefly two major visions on how belief systems change could be 
distinguished (Renshon, 2008, p. 826). The first group evaluates beliefs over a longer period of 
time, the second group examines the influence of specific events on belief systems. Malici and 
Malici (2005) studied the Operational Codes of Fidel Castro and Kim Il Sung over a longer period 
of time, 1980 till 1994, during and after the Cold War era. They found that the operational code of 
Kim Il Sung remained stable, while the P-4, I-5b and I-5c indices of Fidel Castro significantly 
changed. The Operational Code of leaders could theoretically change over time because a process 
of learning could occur. Learning is defined by (Levy, 1994, p. 283) as: ‘the change of beliefs or 
the development of new beliefs, skills, or procedures as a result of the observation and 
interpretation of experience’. Learning processes are considered to be influenced by the frames that 
individuals apply to historical experiences, and because these applied frames differ per person, 
variations in learning across different people in the same situations occur (Levy, 1994, p. 283).  
The influence of specific events on belief systems is studied by a second group of scientists that 
consists of, for example, Walker et al. (1998), Walker and Schafer (2000), Feng (2005) and 
Renshon (2008). Renshon argues, inspired by the Jervis’ study (1976), that belief change could be 
affected by specific events. His study on George W. Bush presents significant Operational Code 
changes in Bush’s first three philosophical beliefs after 9/11. Bush’s view of others became more 
pessimistic, while his beliefs concerning his own position remained stable. The change in 
philosophical beliefs contradicts the assumption that philosophical beliefs are more prone to change 
than instrumental beliefs. The findings of Renshon (2008) are in line with earlier studies on the 
influence of specific events on beliefs. Walker et al. (1998) concluded that Jimmy Carter’s P-1 and 
P-2 beliefs changed significantly after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Carter’s attitude towards 
international cooperation and the realization of his goals became more pessimistic. Walker and 
Schafer (2000) discovered that Lyndon B. Johnsons P-4, and P-5 and I-3 were affected by his 
planning for the Vietnam war. Feng (2005) investigated Mao Zedong’s Operational Code and 
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found a change in all five philosophical beliefs after the Korean War. His view of the political 
universe was already pessimistic and hostile but reinforced during the war.  
Method 
The influence of specific events on a leader’s belief system, will be tested by the case study of the 
2013/2014 Maidan Crisis. The Maidan Crisis beholds a series of demonstrations on the Maidan 
square in Kiev, Ukraine, that occurred because of president Yanukovych’s rejection to sign the 
Association Agreement with the European Union (EU). At the same time, Yanukovych sought 
rapprochement with Russia (Oversloot, 2018). Politicians from the EU supported the demonstrators 
and the renewed affairs between Ukraine and the EU were considered a threat to Russia. 
Considering Ukraine’s history and strategical geographical position, the affairs with this country 
are both important to the EU and Russia (Smeets, 2015). Throughout history, Ukraine has been 
subject to a power-play between the EU and Russia and corporation with this state is a considered 
delicate issue, because of its strategical geographical position. The crisis resulted in an arms race 
of sanctions, and the greater strategic awareness of the importance of Ukraine (Pridham, 2014). 
Both the EU countries and Russia adjusted their foreign policy strategies to the new status of 
international relations. Russia’s annexation of Crimea is an example of these renewed foreign 
policy strategies. Assumptions of, for example, realist theory could provide for explanations for 
the increasing tensions and arms race of sanctions, but structural scholars did not predict the 
annexation of Crimea by Russia (Forsberg & Pursiainen, 2017, p. 221). The cognitive study of 
individuals is neglected by these structural theories, while experts on Russia (Oversloot, 2017: 
Smeets 2015) consider the individual level of Putin relevant when studying Russia’s foreign policy 
and its role within international affairs. Because the Russian decision-making processes are not 
transparent, the more important the cognitive dimension could, potentially, be (Forsberg & 
Pursiainen, 2017, p. 220-221). For this thesis, the events of the Maidan Crisis, are considered a 
specific event that could, based on earlier studies, potentially be of influence on Vladimir Putin’s 
belief system.  
To answer the research question of this thesis, verbal content of Vladimir Putin was analysed by 
using Profiler Plus v. 7.3.2, along with the Operational Code scheme. Putin’s pre-Maidan 
Operational Code is compared to his post-Maidan Operational Code by comparing the outcomes 
produced by Profiler Plus. As explained earlier, the Operational Code construct is based on the 
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principle that a leader’s belief system influences decision-making (George, 1969). The VICS has 
been developed to determine a leader’s belief system ‘at-a-distance’ because it is difficult, or 
maybe impossible, to study leaders directly because they will not take part in experiments or 
interviews that study their inner self. The VICS uses speech acts, such as speeches, letters or 
interviews to indicate a leader’s state of mind by providing quantified answers to George’s ten 
questions (Schafer & Walker, 2006, pp. 31-33). The VICS works in two separate stages. The first 
stage consists of the scaling of the verbs of a sentence between conflictual (-) and cooperative (+). 
These scales consist of six intensities: -3 (punish), -2 (threaten), -1 (oppose), +1 (support) +2 
(promise) +3 (reward). To illustrate this method, the following sentences can be used as example: 
State A invades state B. Invades is the verb of this sentence and is coded as -3 (punish). Verbs that 
cannot be coded as one of the categories, are coded as 0. The second stage of the VICS determines 
whether the grammatical subject refers to him/herself of others with the respect to the exercise of 
power (Schafer & Walker, 2006, pp. 31-32). This distinction is necessary to make because the 
second stage determines the philosophical and instrumental beliefs of a leader. The subject’s 
reference to ‘others’ represent philosophical beliefs, while a reference to him/herself represents 
instrumental beliefs.  
It is possible to do the VICS coding by hand or with a programme such as Profiler Plus (Walker 
& Schafer, 2006, p. 38). Coding by hand is very labour intensive, time consuming and sensitive 
for human error. Profiler Plus is an automated software program, developed by Social Science 
Automation, that is used to generate quantified data for ‘at-a-distance’ analyses of psychological 
studies. One of the disadvantages of automated coding is the disability of software programs to 
subjectively interpret phrases. Although, Profiler Plus was favoured above coding by hand because 
this program makes coding faster, more efficient and it gives a reliability percentage of 100 percent 
(Walker & Schafer, 2006, p. 38). Profiler Plus generates scores of speech acts on the twelve 
different categories, concerning the six intensities from -3 to +3 and the subjects reference to others 
or themselves. Furthermore, the program generates scores on four of the ten Operational Code 
questions. The scores on the P-1, P-2, I-1 and I-2 questions are automatically calculated in a range 
from -1 to +1. The remaining indices were calculated with the formulas stated by Schafer and 
Walker (2006, pp. 33-38). A statistical significant change in the scores on the different indices 
could make a case for belief change. To conduct the relevance of whether Putin’s beliefs changed, 
which beliefs changed and in which direction and intensity the beliefs changed, the meaning of the 
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different beliefs, indices, will be briefly discussed in the upcoming section (Schafer & Walker, 
2006, pp. 33-38).  
P-1 The Nature of the Political Universe 
P-1 is, together with I-1, one of the master beliefs because of the assumption of cognitive 
consistency. The other philosophical beliefs are connected to this indicis. P-1 consists of the 
leader’s image of other actors within the political universe and is scaled from -1 to +1. Lower 
scores indicate a more hostile world view while higher scores assume the leader to have a friendlier 
image of other actors.   
P-2 The Realization of Political Values 
This indicis is scaled from -1 to +1 as well and the lower the score on this index, the more 
pessimistic a leader is on the realization of political values. The higher the score, the more 
optimistic a leader would be. Because all philosophical indices are connected to P1, the score on 
P1 could briefly predict the outcomes on the other philosophical indices. In general, a higher score 
on P-1 would result in a higher score on P-2 because a leader that has a friendlier image of the 
political universe, would be more positive about the realization of political values.  
P-3 The Predictability of the Political Universe 
This indicis beholds a leader’s view on the predictability of the tactics of others. Except from P-1, 
P-2, I-1 and 1-2, all indices are scaled from 0-1. Lower scores on P-3 indicate that leaders belief 
that the political universe is less predictable than when higher scores are gained.  
P-4 Control over Historical Development 
P-4 indicates a leader’s view on who has the control over the political universe, him/herself or 
others. This is the only indicis that focusses on the self/others distinction that is made by the, later 
discusses, VICS. Lower scores are related to beliefs that others are in more control of the political 
universe, while higher scores indicate beliefs about self-control.  
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P-5 The Role of Change 
P-5 is related to P-3 and P-4, because the higher the beliefs about predictability and the self-control 
of the political universe are, the lower the role of change would be. The formula of this indicis is 
1-P3*P4, and therefore lower scores indicate a lower role of change while higher scores indicate 
higher roles assigned to change.  
I-1 Direction of Strategy  
I-1 is, together with P-1, considered a master belief. All the other instrumental indices are 
connected to this index. Instrumental beliefs are divided in two categories on action: one about the 
strategy of action and one about the tactics. Strategies direction in action while tactics vary on 
intensity. The scope of this index reaches from -1 to +1 and lower scores indicate more utility to 
conflict actions, while higher scores indicate more utility to cooperative action.   
I-2 Intensity of Tactics 
This indicis reflects a leader’s beliefs on the intensity of tactics that can reach from -1 to +1. The 
lower the scores, the more likely a leader proceeds to hostile tactics. Higher scores reflect a leader’s 
willingness to cooperative tactics.  
I-3 Risk Orientation 
This indicis concerns the predictability of tactics by means of risk aversion and risk acceptance of 
a leader. Scores are scaled on an index from 0 to 1 and the lower the score, the more aversive a 
leader is to taking risks. The higher the score, the higher the level of rick acceptance is. This indicis 
is made measurable by focussing on the diversity of tactics. The more diverse different tactics are, 
the less risky they are considered, while less diversity within a portfolio of tactics is considered 
riskier.  
I-4 Timing of action 
This indicis consists of two categories: I-4a and I-4b and both concern the flexibility of tactics. I-
4a indicates the flexibility of a leader’s choice in terms of cooperative or conflictual tactics. I-4b 
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measures a flexibility in words and deeds. Both indexes vary from 0-1 and higher scores indicate 
a higher level of flexibility.  
I-5 Utility of means 
This indicis is divided in six subcategories:  
a. Punish 
b. Threaten 
c. Oppose 
d. Appeal 
e. Promise 
f. Reward 
They al indicate a leader’s beliefs about the utility of different tactics that mark the exercise of 
political power. All indices vary from 0-1 and lower scores indicate lower levels of utility, while 
higher scores indicate higher levels of utility.  
Summarized, all indices vary from 0-1, except from P-1, P-2, I-1 and 1-2 that vary on a scale from 
-1 to +1. To define the intensities within the scales, descriptors are developed to provide for 
adequate interpretations of the generated quantified content (Walker et al., 2010a, pp. 226 – 227). 
As mentioned before, ProfilerPlus generates scores and by use of the descriptors, meaning will be 
given to these plain numbers. Regarding the P-1 indicis, the descriptors reach from -1, extremely 
hostile to +1, extremely friendly. -.75 Stands for very hostile, -.5 definitely hostile, -.25 somewhat 
hostile and 0.0 mixed. The positive scores indicate friendlier view of other actors: .25 somewhat 
friendly, .5 definitely friendly and .75 stands for a very friendly worldview. The adjectives that 
indicate the descriptors are the same for the P-1, P-2, I-1 and 1-2 questions since they are rated on 
the same scale. The other questions vary from 0-1. 0.0 Stands for very low, .25 for low, .5 for 
medium, .75 for high and 1 for very high. An overview of the descriptors is presented in table 2 
(Walker et al., 2010a). The relevance of these indices will be clarified in the analysis section when 
the outcomes of the VICS and scores on the various indices will be compared and explained.  
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Table 2a: Philosophical VICS descriptors 
 
 
 
 
Table 2b: Instrumental VICS descriptors 
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Content 
The content that is used was gathered from en.kremlin.ru, the official website of the Russian 
government. The used content consists of public speeches and interviews by and with president 
Vladimir Putin. Speeches are considered non-spontaneous and interviews are considered more 
spontaneous content. Speeches are prepared statements, often written by speechwriters, and just 
recited by the speaker, while interviews are considered more transparent because the interviewee 
has to deal with time limitations to consider the answers. A question that rises regarding the content 
is whether the leader’s or speechwriter’s Operational Code is determined when analysing speeches. 
According to Schafer and Walker (2006, p. 47) the leader’s Operational Code is determined 
because speechwriters are likely to know the leader’s views and do not generally write speeches 
that belie these views. Although, some ‘at-a-distance’ research programs prefer the use of more 
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spontaneous content as interviews. Research has shown that differences exist in the outcomes 
between spontaneous and prepared content (Dille, 2000; Marfleet, 2000; Schafer & Crichlow, 
2000). Several scientists (Renshon, 2008) consider these differences negligible, while others find 
it rather meaningful (Dille, 2000; Marfleet, 2000). It is an area where still more research has to be 
done (Schafer & Walker, 2006. P. 47). Based on this knowledge, the content that is selected for 
this research, consists partly of spontaneous and partly of prepared content.  
The used content is required to be a reflection of the mind of the analysed actor. Therefore, the 
used content should be spoken or written by the actor him/herself. This type of content is preferred 
over the use of secondary literature, because it is considered to be a better representation of the 
state of mind of the leader (Schafer & Walker, 2006, p. 31). Furthermore, Walker and Schafer 
(2008, p. 44) recommend students to use a minimum of ten randomly selected speech acts to 
develop a basic profile of a leader. This recommendation has been followed, and to create a basic 
profile of Putin before and after the Maidan Crisis, a total of 30 speech acts has been selected. I 
made a personal decision to add five speeches to both periods, because I wanted the speeches to 
gradually represent the full periods and cover multiple foreign policy topics. The speech acts were 
held in Russian and were translated by the Russian government. The originally spoken content by 
Putin is not used for this research because Profiler Plus only works with English digital content. It 
is taken into consideration that translations are not ideal to work with, because these translations 
could be sensitive for subtle changes in the meaning of words and sentences. Although, Operational 
Code research on Putin by Dyson and Parent (2018) is based on translated content that is also 
gathered from en.kremlin.ru. Furthermore, Operational Code studies by, inter alia, Feng (2005), 
Malici and Malici (2005), Walker et al. (2010) on Mao Zedong, Fidel Castro, Kim Il Sung and 
Saddam Hussein, are based on non-Anglophonic content. Because Profiler Plus does only work 
with English content, the use of translated speech acts is necessary to make Operational Code 
analyses of non-Anglophonic leaders. Furthermore, the selected content has to meet certain criteria 
about the number of coded verbs. Initially, used speech acts must meet a requirement of 1500 words 
(Renshon, 2008, p. 833), but not all Putin’s content meets this amount of words. Walker and 
Schafer (2006) add another guideline for this matter. They state that usable content must contain 
at least 15 coded verbs. All selected speech acts consist of this minimum. Lastly, the selected the 
speech acts must primarily focus on foreign policy topics (Walker et al., 1998, p. 182; Renshon, 
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2008, p. 833). Taken all these guidelines into consideration, the sample frame of this research 
consists of:  
- Speeches and interviews 
- Spoken by Vladimir Putin 
- Each speech act contains at least 15 coded verbs 
- The speech acts primarily focus on foreign policy topics 
The stability of a leader’s Operational Code and the influence of specific events are analysed in 
this thesis. Therefore, the speech acts were selected from two periods, from May 7 2012 - 
November 20 2013 and from February 23 2014 - August 23 2015. Both periods last 1.5 year and 
the first period starts the day when Putin is inaugurated as president of Russia for the third time. 
This period lasts until the first day of the protest on the Maidan square in Kiev, Ukraine. In this 
thesis, this period is referred to as ‘Pre-Maidan Presidency’. The second period is referred to as 
‘Post-Maidan Presidency’ and starts the day after the end of the Maidan protests and also lasts for 
1.5 year. An overview of the used speeches is presented in appendix 1. 
 
Table 3: Selected speech acts 
Phase Period of time Amount of speech acts  
1. Pre-Maidan 
Presidency 
May 7, 2012 (first day of 
Presidency) – November 20, 
2013 (one day prior to the 
beginning of the Maidan Crisis) 
15 
2. Post-Maidan 
Presidency 
February 23, 2014 (last day of 
the Maidan Crisis) – August 23, 
2015 (one and half year after the 
end of the Maidan Crisis) 
15 
  
The Operational Code values of the first period were compared to the values of the second period 
to examine whether Putin’s belief system was influenced by the exogenous shock of the Maidan 
protests. The two-sample t-test was used to determine whether the values of the two time periods 
changed statistically significant to answer the research question accurately. When making an 
analysis of the two time periods, it has to be taken into consideration that both time periods are 
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relatively short. The results, regarding Putin’s Operational Code profile, are therefore only 
applicable to the time periods in which the data was gathered, because it is not considered possible 
to generalize the results to an overall belief system of a leader (Walker et al., 2010b, pp. 387-388).  
 
Analysis 
A summary of the results of the analysis of Putin’s Operational Code is presented in table 4. The 
table shows the significant change in the P-1, P-2, P-3, P-5, I-1, I-2, I-3, I-4a and I-5oppose indices 
after the specific event of the Maidan-crisis. Appendix 2 consists of the complete SPSS results. 
Nine out of seventeen indices significantly changed after the Maidan-crisis. The consequences for 
Putin’s beliefs based on the Operational Code, are explained in the upcoming section.  
P-1 changed from 0,77 to 0,37, which indicates a shift from a very friendly to a somewhat friendly 
view of the political universe. Putin’s P-2 changed from 0,43 to 0,17, from a definitely optimistic 
to a somewhat optimistic attitude concerning the realization of his political values. P-3 and P-5 
changed significantly as well. P-3 changed from 0,24 to 0,14. This change indicates that Putin’s 
beliefs concerning the predictability of the political universe marginally shifted from low to a little 
lower. P-5 changed in the opposite direction from 0,89 to 0,94. Both indices indicate a very high 
role of change within the political universe. The first, second, fourth and fifth instrumental beliefs 
also changed significantly. I-1 from 0,81 to 0,53, I-2 from 0,41 to 0,25, I-4a from 0,19 to 0,34 and 
I-5oppose from 0,04 to 0,13. The I-1 change indicates a shift from a very cooperative to a definitely 
cooperative direction of strategy, the I-2 change a shift from a definitely cooperative to a somewhat 
cooperative intensity of tactics, the I-4a a marginal shift from a low flexibility of tactics regarding 
cooperation and conflict to a slightly higher but still low flexibility. To conclude, the I-5oppose 
change indicates a shift from a very low utility concerning opposing conflict means, to a slightly 
higher but still very low utility.   
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Table 4:     Operational Code Vladimir Putin 
 Phase 1 
(N=15) 
Phase 2 
(N=15) 
P1           Nature of the Political Universe 0,77 0,37  
(6,051)*** 
P2           Realization of Political Values 0,43 0,17  
(5,113)*** 
P3           Predictability of Political Future 0,24 0,14  
(3,622)*** 
P4           Control over Historical Development 0,43 0,40  
(0,538) 
P5           Role of Change 0,89 0,94 
(-2,323)* 
   
I1           Strategic Approach to Goals 0,81 0,53  
(2,30)* 
I2           Tactical Pursuit of Goals 0,41 0,25  
(2,107)* 
I3           Risk Orientation 0,38 0,30  
(1,792) 
I4           Timing of Action   
a            Cooperation/Conflict 0,19 0,34  
(-2,531)* 
b            Words/Deeds 0,48 0,49  
(-0,116) 
I5           Punish 0,05 0,09  
(-1,128) 
I5            Threaten 0,005 0,016  
(-1,433) 
I5           Oppose 0,04 0,13  
(-2,470)* 
I5           Appeal 0,59 0,53  
(0,977) 
I5           Promise 0,10 0,08  
(0,577) 
I5           Reward 0,21 0,16  
(-2,323) 
Data in bold denote significant results  
*p ≤0,05, **p ≤0,01, ***p ≤0,001 
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As result of the statistical analysis of Putin’s Operational Code beliefs, it is concludable that 9 of 
Putin’s beliefs slightly but significantly changed after the Maidan-crisis. Although, the ascertained 
shifts are not of major magnitude, the direction of change is the same for P-1, P-2, P-3, I-1 and I-
2, and are thus of substantial relevance when it comes to drawing conclusions. The overall patter 
that could be observed is that Putin’s views on the political universe became more pessimistic after 
the Maidan-crisis. These results are similar to the findings of Walker et al. (1998), Walker & 
Schafer (2000), Feng (2005) and Renshon (2008). The Operational Codes of Carter, Johnson, Mao 
Zedong, Bush, and now, Putin became statistically significant less optimistic. Taken this 
information into consideration, the conclusion could be drawn that specific events could affect the 
Operational Code beliefs of leaders. This study, although, does not include an analysis of the 
potential reasons why the events could affect beliefs, and could thus be subject to new puzzles 
within the field.  
In his research, Renshon (2008) touches upon the fact that Bush’s beliefs about himself remained 
relatively stable, while his perception of others shifted ‘dramatically’. Similarities of this finding 
are found in the research on Putin as well. The P-4 indices, which beholds the control over historical 
development, is the only philosophical belief that did not significantly change after the Maidan-
crisis. P-4 indicates the role of the leader, assigned to himself or others concerning the control of 
political events. Although, the P-5 value changed significantly, Putin’s perception on the role of 
change remained very high. The P-5 is composed of the perceptions on the predictability of the 
political universe and the control over historical development. The P-4 remained significantly 
stable, and this stability, potentially, affected the relative stability of P-5, which also concludes the 
perception of himself instead of others.  
As table 4 shows, every philosophical belief, except from P-4, changed significantly after the 
Maidan-crisis, and only four out of eleven instrumental beliefs made a significant shift. This 
contradicts the assumption of cognitive consistency. According to the assumption of cognitive 
consistency, beliefs are hierarchically ordered and instrumental beliefs derive from philosophical 
beliefs.  Therefore, philosophical beliefs are considered more prone to change. This research shows 
the opposite pattern. Renshon’s research on George W. Bush demonstrates this opposite pattern as 
well. Based on the axiom of cognitive consistency, scientists claimed that belief systems are 
composed of ‘master’ and ‘other’ beliefs (Walker et al., 2006).  P-1 and I-1 are defined as master 
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beliefs because they are considered fundamental for the other beliefs. This assumption is refuted 
as well because the ‘other’ beliefs did not change in the same direction, or did not change at all 
after the Maidan-crisis. Because of these results, and the similarities to studies by Renshon (2008), 
the assumption of cognitive consistency could be further impugned.  
Conclusion 
This research contributes to the understanding of the influence of beliefs upon foreign policy 
decision-making. Although the exact relationship between beliefs and policy outcomes and causes 
of belief change are not determined with this research, some relevant issues are drawn to question. 
The analysis of the influence of the Maidan-crisis on Putin’s Operational Code has led to the 
conclusion that the Operational Code of leaders is not per definition stable. The results of the 
analysis show changes within both Putin’s philosophical and instrumental beliefs. His overall 
perception on the political universe became more hostile and pessimistic. Because of the changes 
in both the philosophical and instrumental beliefs, the assumption of cognitive consistency is 
further impugned in several ways: philosophical beliefs are not more prone to change and ‘other’ 
beliefs derive not necessarily from ‘master’ beliefs. Aside from this conclusion, more questions 
rise about the causes of belief change after specific events and the characteristics of those specific 
events that influence beliefs. In addition, the pattern of the relative stability of indices concerning 
the role of the leader him/herself, requires, like the rest of the questioned issues that are touched 
upon, further research before they could be resolved. To conclude, with this research, I distance 
myself from the statement that cognitive studies provide for a full understanding of the field of IR, 
but at the same time, cognitive studies on leaders could be used in addition to more structural 
scholars that sometimes lack the capability of explaining major events. Bringing the study of 
leaders back in the research programs on world politics and international relations could provide 
for more explanations for events that happen in the world we live in.  
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Appendix 1: Used speech acts 
 
Pre-Maidan Speech Acts 
 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/15224       7 May 2012  
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/15698    20 June 2012  
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts16027      20 July 2012  
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/16702     23 October 2012 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/17069    5 December 2012  
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/messages/17118  12 December 2012  
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/17842    7 April 2013 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/18529    5 July 2013  
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/19281    25 September 2013  
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/19484     24 October 2013  
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/19600    11 November 2013  
Spontaneous material 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/15698     20 June 2012 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/17978     25 April 2013  
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/19382    8 October 2013 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/19600     11 November 2013 
 
 
Post-Maidan Speech Acts 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603    18 March 2014  
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/21080    23 May 2014  
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/46229    15 July 2014 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/46305    22 July 2014  
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/46494    26 August 2014  
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/46709     1 October 2014  
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46860     24 October 2014  
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http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/47045     20 November 2014 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/messages/47173   4 December 2014 
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Appendix 2: T-test Results (SPSS) 
 
Group Statistics 
 
Period N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
I1 1 15 ,8136 ,12780 ,03300 
2 15 ,5330 ,45467 ,11739 
I2 1 15 ,4131 ,14471 ,03736 
2 15 ,2462 ,27058 ,06986 
I3 1 15 ,3827 ,13215 ,03412 
2 15 ,2967 ,13069 ,03375 
I4a 1 15 ,1867 ,12664 ,03270 
2 15 ,3353 ,18901 ,04880 
I4b 1 15 ,4813 ,29737 ,07678 
2 15 ,4927 ,23368 ,06034 
I5Punish 1 15 ,0473 ,06065 ,01566 
2 15 ,0880 ,12571 ,03246 
I5Threaten 1 15 ,0047 ,01356 ,00350 
2 15 ,0160 ,02746 ,00709 
I5Oppose 1 15 ,0420 ,04916 ,01269 
2 15 ,1307 ,13003 ,03357 
I5Appeal 1 15 ,5947 ,17844 ,04607 
2 15 ,5280 ,19498 ,05034 
I5Promise 1 15 ,1020 ,13728 ,03545 
2 15 ,0800 ,06761 ,01746 
I5Reward 1 15 ,2100 ,14818 ,03826 
2 15 ,1593 ,08884 ,02294 
P1 1 15 ,7670 ,16126 ,04164 
2 15 ,3705 ,19593 ,05059 
P2 1 15 ,4296 ,11710 ,03024 
2 15 ,1652 ,16244 ,04194 
P3 1 15 ,2407 ,09772 ,02523 
2 15 ,1433 ,03579 ,00924 
P4 1 15 ,4347 ,18890 ,04877 
2 15 ,3967 ,19769 ,05104 
P5 1 15 ,8853 ,09561 ,02469 
2 15 ,9447 ,02532 ,00654 
 Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
I1 Equal variances assumed 1,931 ,176 2,301 28 ,029 ,28055 ,12194 ,03076 ,53034 
Equal variances not assumed   2,301 16,198 ,035 ,28055 ,12194 ,02230 ,53880 
I2 Equal variances assumed ,144 ,708 2,107 28 ,044 ,16697 ,07923 ,00468 ,32926 
Equal variances not assumed   2,107 21,403 ,047 ,16697 ,07923 ,00239 ,33154 
I3 Equal variances assumed ,037 ,849 1,792 28 ,084 ,08600 ,04799 -,01230 ,18430 
Equal variances not assumed   1,792 27,997 ,084 ,08600 ,04799 -,01230 ,18430 
I4a Equal variances assumed 1,979 ,171 -2,531 28 ,017 -,14867 ,05875 -,26900 -,02833 
Equal variances not assumed   -2,531 24,461 ,018 -,14867 ,05875 -,26979 -,02754 
I4b Equal variances assumed 1,688 ,204 -,116 28 ,908 -,01133 ,09765 -,21136 ,18869 
Equal variances not assumed   -,116 26,517 ,908 -,01133 ,09765 -,21187 ,18920 
I5Punish Equal variances assumed ,864 ,361 -1,128 28 ,269 -,04067 ,03604 -,11449 ,03315 
Equal variances not assumed   -1,128 20,182 ,272 -,04067 ,03604 -,11580 ,03446 
I5Threaten Equal variances assumed 6,918 ,014 -1,433 28 ,163 -,01133 ,00791 -,02753 ,00487 
Equal variances not assumed   -1,433 20,441 ,167 -,01133 ,00791 -,02781 ,00514 
I5Oppose Equal variances assumed 4,782 ,037 -2,470 28 ,020 -,08867 ,03589 -,16219 -,01514 
Equal variances not assumed   -2,470 17,923 ,024 -,08867 ,03589 -,16410 -,01324 
I5Appeal Equal variances assumed ,125 ,726 ,977 28 ,337 ,06667 ,06824 -,07312 ,20646 
Equal variances not assumed   ,977 27,783 ,337 ,06667 ,06824 -,07317 ,20651 
I5Promise Equal variances assumed 2,401 ,132 ,557 28 ,582 ,02200 ,03951 -,05894 ,10294 
Equal variances not assumed   ,557 20,415 ,584 ,02200 ,03951 -,06031 ,10431 
I5Reward Equal variances assumed 6,913 ,014 1,136 28 ,266 ,05067 ,04461 -,04071 ,14204 
Equal variances not assumed   1,136 22,913 ,268 ,05067 ,04461 -,04163 ,14297 
P1 Equal variances assumed 1,578 ,219 6,051 28 ,000002 ,39647 ,06552 ,26226 ,53068 
Equal variances not assumed   6,051 27,001 ,000002 ,39647 ,06552 ,26204 ,53091 
P2 Equal variances assumed 2,556 ,121 5,113 28 ,000020 ,26436 ,05170 ,15845 ,37027 
Equal variances not assumed   5,113 25,457 ,000026 ,26436 ,05170 ,15797 ,37075 
P3 Equal variances assumed 15,456 ,001 3,622 28 ,001 ,09733 ,02687 ,04229 ,15238 
Equal variances not assumed   3,622 17,689 ,002 ,09733 ,02687 ,04081 ,15386 
P4 Equal variances assumed ,037 ,850 ,538 28 ,595 ,03800 ,07060 -,10662 ,18262 
Equal variances not assumed   ,538 27,942 ,595 ,03800 ,07060 -,10663 ,18263 
P5 Equal variances assumed 12,402 ,001 -2,323 28 ,028 -,05933 ,02554 -,11164 -,00702 
Equal variances not assumed   -2,323 15,954 ,034 -,05933 ,02554 -,11348 -,00519 
 
